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THE ELIMINATION OF , SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The 1970's will be a decade of reform in the area of labor law for
women. Fifty years after being given the right to vote,' women have
renewed demands for their rights in other areas of the law. Perhaps
the greatest and most appealing of these demands is the abolishment
of sex discrimination in employment practices. Statistics show that
more and more women are entering the labor force every year,' yet
the laws with regard to labor have not kept pace with this change in
the social and economic development of the country. Since 1923,
amendments to the Constitution have been proposed which would
give women equal rights under the law. 3 In 19504 and in 1953,3 the
Senate approved such an amendment, but limited its effect by attach-
ing a clause which virtually nullified any beneficial aspects of the
amendment.° The Second Session of the Ninety-first Congress saw
renewed efforts' to pass an amendments on the wave of a Women's
Rights Movement which has gained wide support throughout the
country and in Congress. The proponents of a Women's Rights
Amendment seek this change because of a failure of the Supreme
Court to interpret the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as applying
to sex discrimination.° However, it is conceded that by the time the
Amendment could be enacted, its effect on employment discrimination
would be insignificant due to recent court decisions, agency rulings,
and changes in state legislation." Furthermore, outside the area of
labor relations an Amendment would result in consequences adverse
1 U.S. Const. amend. XIX,
2 In 1947, 20% of the married women were in the labor force. In 1967, this figure
rose to 33%. See Monthly Labor Review, Feb. 1968 at 1.
8 President's Commission on the Status of Women, Report of the Committee on
Civil and Political Rights 32 (1963).
4 96 Cong. Rec. 872-73 (1950).
6 99 Cong. Rec. 8954-955 (1953).
0 The "Hayden Rider" designated that the amendment "shall not be construed to
impair any rights, benefits, or exemptions now or hereafter conferred by law, upon
persons of the female sex." 99 Cong. Rec. 8955 (1953) (statement of Amendment by
Legislative Clerk).
7 See Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
8 The amendment read in part:
Section 1: Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress and the several
States shall have power, within their respective jurisdictions, to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation . . . .
Hearings on S.J. Res. 61, supra note 7, at 3.
9 See Murray and Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232, 237 (1965).
le Report by Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women 2 (Aug. 25, 1970).
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to women in areas such as military service, life insurance premium
rates, criminal penalties, state support laws and alimony.'
This comment will demonstrate that the goal of equality in em-
ployment can be advanced through statutory modifications and through
more responsive judicial utilization of presently available federal
statutory prohibitions against discrimination based on sex. No attempt
will be made to discuss the entire range of remedies for unlawful dis-
crimination. Rather, this comment will focus upon two areas of statu-
tory coverage of discrimination in employment as being workable
alternatives to a Women's Rights Amendment. The two Acts which
will be discussed are Title VII of the 'Civil Rights Act of 196412
and the Labor Management Relations Act."
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Congress's first efforts" to eliminate sex discriminatory employ-
ment practices culminated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The bill before Congress proposing Title VII initially covered only
the areas of race, color, religion and national origin. "Sex" was added
in an effort to defeat the bill.' The effort failed and the bill passed
with "sex" included in it. However, despite this attitude of the drafters
toward the inclusion of sex discrimination within the coverage of Title
VII, Title VII has in fact become the primary statutory weapon
against discrimination on the basis of sex. This comment will suggest
several methods by which the effectiveness of Title VII may be signi-
ficantly increased.
A. Judicial Recognition of Discriinination Based on Sex
' The basic anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII are found in
Section 703 (a) which provides that it shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
11 See Hearings on S.I. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the
judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 72-86 (testimony of Prof. Freund).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964).
18 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
14 In 1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964)). This
Act merely provides equal pay for equal work. The fact that this Act did not guarantee
women the right to acquire a better job had some influence on Congress in passing
Title VII. See L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law 132 n.1 (1969).
15 See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 431, 441
(1966).
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status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
The application of these provisions requires an initial determina-
tion by the courts that there has been discrimination based on sex.
However, due to the lack of congressional history on what constitutes
sex discrimination,17
 the courts have had to "wrestle with the problems
as best they can."" This lack of legislative guidance has led to judicial
confusion in the recognition of certain employment practices as acts of
sex discrimination. Such confusion is evidenced by the court's opinion
in Phillips v. Martin-Marietta." In Phillips, female applicants with
pre-school age children were refused employment for the position of
Assembly Trainee, while men with pre-school age children were hired
for the job. In an action brought by the female applicants under Title
VII, the employer claimed that this practice was not discriminatory
since all women were not excluded from the position. It was contended
that since exclusion was based upon the additional factor of having
pre-school age children, there was no discrimination on the basis of sex
within the meaning of Title VII.
The Phillips court strictly construed Title VII as applying only
where there is "discrimination based solely on one of the categories, i.e.,
in the case of sex, women vis-a-vis men."" The court held that When-
ever discrimination is based upon another factor in addition to one of
those prohibited categories, the practice is not unlawful under Title VII.
Therefore, the court concluded that this two-pronged qualification of
"sex plus" the additional factor of having pre-school age children
rendered Title VII inapplicable. 2
 However, the adoption of this "sex
plus" standard would allow employers to circumvent Title VII by the
addition of arbitrary qualifications to the basic distinguishing factor
of sex. This reasoning in Phillips, therefore, must be viewed as "a
palpably wrong" 22
 interpretation of the extent to which sex must be
the sole criterion in determining whether there has been a violation of
Title VII.
Earlier cases applying Title VII indicate a more reasonable and
10 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-2(a) (1964). Since the vast majority of cases brought under
Title VII are within the employer section rather than the employment agency or labor
organization sections, and since many of the principles are applicable to all three, this
section will deal exclusively with employer practices.
17 See Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 484, 492 n.56 (1968).
18
 Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
Brooklyn L. Rev. 62, 79 (1964).
19 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), petition for rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1257 (1969),
cert. granted, 397 U.S. 960 (1970).
20 411 F.2d at 3.
21 Id. at 4. The court indicated by way of dicta that there were sociological con-
siderations involved in allowing fathers with pre-school age children to work, but not
allowing mothers with pre-school age children to work.
22 416 F.2d at 1259.
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effective interpretation than that expressed in Phillips. In Cooper v.
Delta Air Lines,28
 the plaintiff stewardesses asserted a violation of
Title VII because of their being discharged when they married. Their
discharge was pursuant to the contract their employer had all stew-
ardesses sign as a condition of employrnent. The court held that there
was no discrimination based on sex because the employer hired no
stewards, and hence the only discrimination lay in the females' marital
status.24
 The provisions of Title VII, however, were found to be
applicable in Sprogis v. United Airlines.25 There, former stewardesses
charged the defendant airline with a violation of section 703 (a) in
maintaining a policy of discharging stewardesses who married, but not
stewards who married. In reinstating the women to their former
employment, the court found that a comparison of all the qualifications
for the job indicated the plaintiffs were fired solely on account of their
SeX.20
The Cooper and Sprogis cases are indicative of the proper inter-
pretation of "sex discrimination" under Title VII. Should the courts fol-
low the "sex plus" approach adopted in 'Phillips, the employer would be
free to continue his discriminatory practices by arbitrarily modifying the
qualifications for a job and thereby 'render Title VII impotent to
eliminate these practices. To enable the provisions of Title VII to be
effective against discriminatory employment practices, the courts must
determine whether in each particular case sex is, in fact, the distin-
guishing factor. When reviewing all of the qualifications for a job, if
the court finds that the male and female applicant meet such qualifica-
tions except for the factor of sex, th6n it must classify this as dis-
crimination based on sex. 27
B. The Administration of Title VII
The correct recognition of sex discriminatory practices is, of
course, only a preliminary step in the application of Title VII. In
addition, the elimination of discriminatory employment practices re-
quires an effective enforcement procedure through which an aggrieved
party may seek relief, and the establishment of uniform standards for
the application of Title VII. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) provides the means for realizing both of these
requirements. In an attempt to develop uniform standards under which
Title VII could be more effectively applied, the Commission was
given the authority to evaluate individual complaints and to issue
interpretative guidelines concerning the provisions of Title VII. 28
28 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
24 Id. at 783.
25 2 — F. Supp.	 F.E.P. Cases 385 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
20
 Id. at 386.
27 Of course, a final finding of unlawful discrimination based on sex depends upon
full consideration of all the provisions of Title VII, such as the possibility of an exemp-
tion under 703(e).
28 42 U.S.C. 1 2000e-12(a) (1964).
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The need for uniformity is especially important in applying those
sections of Title VII that are not clarified by legislative history. One
such provision is section 703 (e) which allows an employer to discrimi-
nate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if the employer can
prove that such discrimination is a "bona fide occupational qualification
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise . . . ." 23
 The legislative history of this section provides no
basis for an authoritative interpretation of the bona Me occupational
qualification exception.3° It was suggested in Congress that this excep-
tion be construed narrowly—but this suggestion was made before
"sex" was added to Title VII." Because of this paucity of legislative
history it seems appropriate that the interpretations given by the
EEOC should be consulted to supplement those areas of Title VII
about which Congress was silent. However, despite the numerous
rulings on this section by the EEOC," the courts have too often ignored
these administrative guidelines.
An example of the courts failure to follow the EEOC in this area
is Diaz v. Pan American World Airways." In Diaz, the male plaintiff's
application for a position as a flight cabin attendant was rejected
pursuant to the defendant airline's policy of hiring only females for
that position. The airline claimed that its discriminatory hiring policies
were within the protection of section 703(e) since psychological ev-
idence and passenger preference surveys indicated that females, as a
class, are more qualified than males to act as cabin attendants. The
court accepted the airline's argument, and held that discrimination on
the basis of sex in this case was within the exemption provided by
Section 703 (e) and, therefore; was not unlawful under Title VII."
This result directly contradicted a ruling by the EEOC which held that
the position of flight cabin attendant could not qualify for exemption
under section 703 (e) since the "basic duties" of this position could be
satisfactorily performed by members of both sexes." The court in
Diaz expressly rejected this EEOC guideline, noting that EEOC rul-
ings are "entitled to deference" but are not binding upon the courts."
EEOC guidelines have also been rejected in the interpretation of
section 703 (h) which provides in part:
... it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
33 See Berg, supra note 18.
81 H.R. Rep No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1963).
82 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has ruled that this exception
should be interpreted narrowly (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1970)); that it would not apply
where refusal to hire an individual was based on assumptions of the comparative em-
ployment characteristics of women in general (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1) (i) (1970)) ; or
based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (1)(11) (1970) ).
88 311 F. Supp. .559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
84
 Id. at 569.
35
 33 Fed. Reg. 3361 (1968).
38
 311 F. Supp. at 568.
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employer . . . to give and to act upon the results of any pro-
fessionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate, because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."
Section 703 (h), like section 703 (e), lacks sufficient legislative history
to clarify the intended purposes and scope of this section. 38 However,
despite the absence of clear congressional language to aid in the inter-
pretation of section 703 (h), the courts have not uniformly followed
the guidelines of the EEOC clarifying this section.
In Griggs .v. Duke Power Co.," the plaintiff employee contended
that the defendant employer's use of generalized employment tests
was a racially discriminatory practice in violation of Title VII. The
plaintiff contended that these testing requirements were not protected
by section 703 (h) since the tests were not related to any specific job
skills but measured only general intelligence. The court rejected this
contention and held that section 703(h) applied to any bona fide
employment test created by a qualified expert regardless of whether or
not the test measured a particular employment skill." In reaching this
conclusion, the Griggs court disregarded an EEOC guideline limiting
the application of section 703 (h) to tests which fairly measure the
knowledge or skills required by a particular job or class of jobs.'
As exemplified by the decisions in Diaz and Griggs, courts have
not followed EEOC guidelines in interpreting sections of Title VII that
are not clarified by accompanying legislative history. This judicial
disregard of EEOC guidelines overlooks the expertise of the EEOC in
the area of discriminatory employment practices which could act as a
comprehensive substitute for the insufficient legislative history of
certain sections of Title VII. These guidelines should be followed
especially' since rulings by the EEOC involve "a contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of
setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently
and smoothly while they are yet untried and new."" The effectiveness
of EEOC rulings in clarifying the interpretation of Title VII depends
largely upon uniform judicial acceptance of these guidelines. As long
as individual courts disregard the current standards set forth by the
EEOC, a more effective and uniform application of Title VII will not
be realized.
87
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
38 See Comment, Employment Testing Under
of 1964, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 268, 276 (19
89
 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
90 Id. at 1235.
41 EEOC Guideline, CCH Empl. Prac. Guide §
1240.
92 Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Electricians, 367
F.2d at 1241 (dissenting opinion).
U.S. 396, 408 (1961), cited in 420
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
70).
16,094, at 7319, cited in 420 F.2d at
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In addition to a lack of uniformity, Title VII has been ineffective
because present enforcement procedures place the burden of enforce-
ment on the individual." The aggrieved party presently must wait
up to eighteen months before the EEOC can handle her complaint.
Once the Commission does handle her complaint, there is no assurance
that her grievance will be remedied. The Commission's conciliatory
efforts have been unsuccessful in more than half of the cases in which
discrimination occurred." In those cases which are not settled through
conciliation, the aggrieved party must bear the burden of bringing a
private suit." This civil action encompasses expensive legal fees and
a long delay in the over-crowded federal district courts. This demand-
ing procedure is discouraging not only to the aggrieved party, but also
to those individuals who look to Title VII as a possible remedy to
existing discriminatory employment practices. The ineffectiveness of
the EEOC in administering Title VII is due principally to the limited
powers granted the Commission under Section 706(a) which provides:
If the Commission shall determine, after . . . investigation,
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge of
unlawful discrimination is true, the Commission shall en-
deavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation
and persuasion. 48
Although the Commission's powers are thus presently limited to
conference and conciliation,47 there have been considerable congres-
sional efforts to extend these powers. The bill creating Title VII
originally vested in the EEOC powers similar to those held by the
National Labor Relations Board." Since then, other bills before
Congress have proposed the extension of the Commission's powers.
In 1967, a bill was introduced which would have empowered the
Commission to issue cease and desist orders, and would have had the
Attorney General litigate any case where the employer disregarded the
order." Current congressional proposals would confer upon the Corn-
43 The Report of the President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibil-
ities, A Matter of Simple Justice 6 (April 1970).
44 Id.
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
47 Though Congress in setting up this procedure specifically preferred voluntary
compliance on the employer's part to judicial action, see, e.g., Dent v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1969), recent decisions have recog-
nized that the fact that the Commission did not engage in conciliation would not pre-
clude an individual from bringing a civil action under Title VII. This current judicial
approach clearly indicates a shift away from attempts at solving employment problems
through conciliation. See Dent, supra; Johnson v, Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 405
F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968).
48 109 Cong. Rec. 13009 (1963).
40 5.1308, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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mission the authority to institute enforcement actions in the federal
district courts."
The EEOC should be given the power to institute civil actions
against the employer on behalf of the aggrieved party when it has
reasonable cause to believe a violation exists. The individual .com-
plainant possesses neither the broad investigatory powers nor the ex-
pertise in discriminatory employment practices that the EEOC posses-
ses, nor can the individual bear the expense of litigation as well as the
EEOC could. The transfer of the power to institute a civil action to
the Commission would still enable a cooperative employer to reach an
agreement before actual court action, but would serve as a deterrent
to those uncooperative employers who previously relied on the lengthy
procedure to delay or discourage potential court actions. Without
this transfer of power, the effectiveness of Title VII's substantive
protection against discrimination based on sex will continue to be
seriously hindered.
C. The Enforcement of Title VII By The Attorney General
Since over half of the complaints received by the EEOC are not
settled through conciliation," consideration must be given to alterna-
tive means of enforcement provided in Title VII. One such method
was established in section 707(a), which provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern
or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the
full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney
General may bring a civil action requesting such relief, in-
cluding an application for a permanent or temporary injunc-
tion, restraining order or other order . . . as he deems
necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein
described."
The legislative history of the passage of Section 707 (a) indicates that
this section was meant to be an important factor in the enforcement of
Title VII. Since the powers of the EEOC were limited to conciliation
and advice,53 section 705 (g) (6) 54 was enacted to enable the EEOC
to refer matters to the Attorney General for the institution of a civil
action under section 707(a). The enactment of 705 (g) (6) was in-
tended to assure proponents of a strong EEOC that an effective en-
forcement procedure would be available under section 707(a) in
50 Berg, supra note 18, at 64-65.
51 See note 43 supra.
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
153 See p. 729 infra.
im 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4(f) (6)(1964).
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addition to an individual's right to maintain a private action." How-
ever, despite this legislative intention: to create an effective method of
enforcement through section 707(a), 'it was not until July, 1970, that
the Attorney General brought a suit under that section against a
"pattern or practice" of sex discrimination.5°
The Attorney General's neglect in using section 707 (a) is not the
result of the inapplicability of the section itself. Legislative history
indicates that "such a pattern or practice would be present only when
the denial of rights consists of something more than an isolated, spora-
dic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature." (Em-
phasis added.)" While this interpretation of the scope of section
707 (a) excludes acts that are merely isolated incidents, most acts of
discrimination on the basis of sex should be recognized as being of a
"generalized nature" and therefore constituting a "pattern or practice"
within the terms of section 707(a).
The recognition of the generalized nature of acts of sex dis-
crimination has been demonstrated through judicial approval of class
actions brought by plaintiffs alleging unlawful discrimination on the
basis of sex. The courts have held that individual plaintiffs bringing
such suits under Title VII are "vindicating not individual, but public
rights."" This approach was followed in Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp.," where a black employee alleged that his employer's promotion
system was discriminatory and in violation of Title VII. Subsequent to
the institution of the action, the plaintiff employee was promoted and
the district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action as
moot." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit" reversed dismissal
of the suit, and held that the plaintiff's promotion did not render the
action moot since the employment practices in question continued to
affect the rights of other employees." The decision of the court of
appeals demonstrates the general nature of sex discrimination since the
extinguishing of an individual's claim , was recognized as not invalidat-
ing the rights of other employees to have the discriminatory practice
eliminated.
The generalized nature of acts of sex discrimination is also evident
in judicial awards of damages to employees other than the actual com-
plainants. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.," the complainant em-
ployees charged that the defendant employer had unlawfully dis-
criminated through a seniority system which permitted men to bid for
Vaas, supra note 15, at 451-52.
58
 United States v. Libbey Owens-Ford Co., Complaint No. C70-212 filed July 20,
1970 (N.D. Ohio), in Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1970, at 8, col. 3.
37
 110 Cong. Rec. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
58 416 F.2d at 1258 (dissenting opinion).
59 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
60
 261 F. Supp. 762, 764 (ED. Tex. 1966).
el 400 F.2d at 35.	 '
82 Id. at 33.
63 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
731 '
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
all jobs, but limited women to jobs not requiring lifting more than
thirty-five pounds. The court held that the weight restriction was in
violation of Title VII since the limitation was based on an arbitrary sex
stereotype, and no provisions were made to allow individual employees
to prove their ability to perform more strenuous tasks." Upon this
finding, the court held that damages were not limited to the employees
who had filed suit, but that any other similarly situated employee could
apply to the court for appropriate relief." The extension of relief to
these employees was based upon the court's recognition of the general-
ized nature of suits against sex discrimination since "the evil sought
to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic."'
These cases demonstrate that most permanent employer practices
which discriminate on the basis of sex are of a generalized nature and,
therefore, fall within the scope of section 707 (a). While this section
does not apply to temporary employment practices, the intended broad
application to permanent practices should be recognized. The applica-
tion of Section 707 (a) by the Attorney General would more effectively
implement Title VII, and is a needed departure from the present
neglect of Section 707 (a).
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE UNION DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION UNDER THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT
The enactment of Title VII engendered congressional concern as
to its effect upon the Labor Management Relations Act 67 (LMRA)
and other existing acts which determined union-employment relations.
In a letter from the Department of Justice to former Senator Clark, the
Department assured the Senator that the National Labor Relations
Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction if a case came under
both acts, and that the duties of the employers and labor organizations
under the LMRA would not be affected." This prediction has been
fulfilled by judicial experience demonstrating that Title VII and the
LMRA may be accommodated without conflict. Thus, it has been held
that an employee is not precluded from bringing a suit for an unfair
labor practice under the LMRA by the specific protection given to
employees from discrimination under Title VII." The courts have
recognized an employee's right to maintain an action under Title VII
where an employee proceeds under the grievance procedures within
the LMRA, but fails to exhaust these procedures," or the union
64 Id. at 717-18.
05 Id. at 719.
66 Id.
67 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
68 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964).
00 See Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1966),
7° See Evans v. Local 2127 IBEW, 313 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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decides to proceed no longer.' Moreover, it has been held that an em-
ployee may bring an action under Title VII even though the action
was within the original jurisdiction of the NLRB since Title VII
provides statutory rights exclusive of the rights under the LMRA. 72
The accommodation of these overlaping acts is due in part to the
fact that the LMRA contains no provisions which directly prohibit
union discrimination on the basis of sex. However, under the LMRA
employees are guaranteed the fundamental right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing." As a correlative of
this right, the LMRA grants to the unions selected by the majority of
the employees the right to be the exclusive representatives of the em-
ployees for the purpose of collective bargaining." Where the union
serves such a vital function in determining the conditions under which
an employee will work, the union must be held subject to certain
restrictions. Courts, cognizant of this important union-employee re-
lationship, have imposed upon the unions a duty of fair representation.
The duty of fair union representation was first enunciated under
the Railway Labor Act" in 1944 in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co." In Steele, the petitioner, a black member of a firemans
union, alleged that without first notifying the black firemen of their
negotiations, the union and the railroad entered into an agreement
which reduced the number of carriers employing blacks and which ad-
versely affected their seniority rights. Under this agreement the
petitioner was replaced by a white fireman and was subsequently given
a less desirable and less remunerative job. When protests of black
firemen to the union were ignored, the petitioner sought to enjoin the
enforcement of the agreement, to enjoin the union from representing
him so long as the union discriminated against him, and to recover
damages against the union for its wrongful conduct." The Supreme
Court of Alabama held on the merits that the complaint stated no
cause of action." In reversing that court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that the union had breached its statutory duty of
representation to the black firemen, and granted the petitioner's re-
quest for an injunction and damages."
The Supreme Court in rendering this decision held that the
representative union had a duty under the Railway Labor Act to
protect the interests of all members of the craft, not just those of the
71 See Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe and Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195, 198 (WI).
Va. 1969).
72 See Bremer v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R. Co., 310 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (ED.
Mo. 1969).
18 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
74 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
75 45 U.S.C. § 151 at seq. (1964).
76 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
77 Id. at 197.
78 245 Ala. 113, 122, 16 So.2d, 416, 423 (1944).
79 323 US. at 207.
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white majority. In defining this duty, the Court stated that "the statu-
tory power to represent a craft and to make contracts as to wages,
hours and working conditions does not include.the authority to make,
among members of the craft, discriminations not based on such rele-
vant differences."" The Court set out as examples differences "relevant
to the authorized purposes of the contract . . . such as differences in
seniority, the type of work performed, [and] the competence and
skill with which it is performed. . . .""
Despite the sweeping import of the Steele rationale, the courts
moved slowly to enforce this duty of fair representation. The next
major case which applied the Steele doctrine arose under the LMRA
in 1953 in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman." In Huffman, an employee
asserted that a collective bargaining agreement was invalid since it
established a seniority system for veterans which adversely affected
him. Under the agreement some employees who commenced work
after the plaintiff received seniority rights over the plaintiff. The
Court upheld the seniority agreement, noting that the complete satis-
faction of all union members was not possible but that " Whe complete
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide
range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining
representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its dis-
cretion."" The Court was attempting to refine the area of legitimate
discriminations which a union could make in best serving its members,
recognizing the fact that some employees will not fare as well under
a collective bargaining agreement as other employees.
Until 1962, the courts alone had developed the duty of fair
representation doctrine into a statutory duty which was judicially
enforceable. In Miranda Fuel Co. v. NLRB," the Board for the first
time considered a union's breach of the duty of fair representation as
an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the
LMRA.85 In Miranda Fuel, an employee claimed that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation by compelling the employer
to reduce the plaintiff's seniority status for an unauthorized early
leave of absence as set out in the collective bargaining agreement. The
Board recognized that the Steele case established a union duty to
represent all of its members equally and without discrimination on the
basis of race, color or creed." Based upon the Steele rationale, the
Board concluded that a union violates section 8 (b) (1) (A) whenever
the union, acting in its capacity as statutory representative, takes
so Id. at 203.
81 Id.
82 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
83 Id. at 338.
84 140 NLRB 181, 51 LRRM 1585 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963).
85 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(1) (A) (1964).
88 140 NLRB at 185, 51 LRRM at 1587.
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action "against any employee upon considerations or classifications
which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair." 87
Although Miranda Fuel was denied enforcement on other
grounds," the principles set forth were reaffirmed in Local 12 v.
NLRB." There, black employees were laid off although they had
acquired more seniority than whites. The union refused to take
investigatory action since there had been no contract violation. Al-
though the blacks were subsequently reinstated, the union refused to
process their grievances concerning back wages or the existing segre-
gated facilities. The Board had found that the union's breach of its duty
of fair representation was a section 8 (b) (1) (A) violation." The Fifth
Circuit granted enforcement of the Board's order and held that the
union's failure to process the employee's grievances violated its duty
to represent the employee fairly and impartially without discrimina-
tion.'u Hence, it appears that the courts and the NLRB have readily
accepted the concept of a duty of fair representation."
While this duty of fair union representation has not been applied
specifically to the area of sex, it is reasonable to extend this duty to
practices of discrimination based on sex. In the absence of any clear
legislative intent to the contrary, it is reasonable to conclude that this
statutory duty of fair representation as expressed in Steele applies
beyond the narrow area of race discrimination" to all forms of hostile
discrimination by unions." The broad scope of this duty was recog-
nized in Local 12 where the court compared the duty of fair represen-
tation and Title VII and concluded that:
.. . there continues to exist a broad potential range of arbi-
trary union conduct not specifically covered by Title VII
which may also 'violate the union's duty of fair representa-
tion. The comprehensive right of an employee to be repre-
sented fairly and in good faith by his exclusive bargaining
agent clearly encompasses more than freedom from union
discrimination based solely upon race, religion, and sex."
This assessment of the breadth of a union's duty appears to be
87 Id.
88 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 1963),
99 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
" Id. at 15.
81 Id. at 19.
82 This comment has not discussed the subordinate problem of whether this duty
of fair representation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts or of the NLRB.
The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that violations of a union's duty of
representation are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB (Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 183 (1967)). For further discussion of this problem see Cox, the Duty of
Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151, 173 (1957) ; H. Wellington, Labor and the Legal
Process, 172-75 (1968).
95 See Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibil-
ity in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1335 (1958).
84 See Cox, supra note 92, at 159-60.
95 368 F.2d at 24.
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correct. Unions must in all cases act with "good faith and honesty of
purpose”" and avoid practices which are "irrelevant, invidious, or
unfair."'n These requirements of fair representation encompass race,
religion, sex, national origin and more. The present recognition by the
NLRB and the courts of the applicability of the duty of fair
representation in sex discrimination cases is as necessary and plausible
as was the Court's recognition in 1944 of the applicability of the
doctrine in race discrimination cases. Should the courts and the NLRB
so recognize a female's right under this theory, reliance upon the
enforcement-deficient Title VII in suits against a union would be
avoided, and the possibility of finally eliminating sex discrimination
in this area vastly improved.
CONCLUSION
The present concern throughout the nation for equal rights for
women is well justified in the area of labor relations. Yet, significant
progress toward equality in employment can be made without the
enactment of a Women's Right Amendment. The presently available
anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII could be made substan-
tially more effective by statutorily enlarging the powers of the EEOC
and thus relieving the individual complainant of the burden of bring-
ing a private suit as the primary means of enforcing the right to fair
employment. Increased judicial recognition of employment practices
which do in fact discriminate on the basis of sex, and a more active
utilization by the Attorney General of his powers to enjoin generalized
discrimination practices would also contribute to the realization of the
promise of equal employment. In addition to the broad anti-discrimi-
nation coverage already available in Title VII, the extension of the
duty of fair union representation to the area of sex discrimination
offers another means of guaranteeing fair employment to the great
number of female employees who are union members. These suggested
approaches to greater equality in employment for women demonstrate
the availability of workable solutions to the problem of sex discrimina-
tion that avoid the difficulties inherent in the passage of a Women's
Rights Amendment and the possible adverse consequences of its en-
actment.
WILLIAM L. EATON
9° 345 U.S. at 338.
97 140 NLRB at 185, 51 LRAM at 1587.
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